Many companies with consumer direct service models, especially grocery delivery services, have found that home delivery poses an enormous logistical challenge due to the unpredictability of demand coupled with strict delivery windows and low profit margin products. In this paper, we examine the use of incentives to influence consumer behavior in order to reduce delivery costs. We propose optimization models for two forms of incentives and demonstrate their value and impact through simulation studies.
direct is quickly becoming one of the most important business models, but there are still many open questions about how to run such businesses efficiently and effectively.
There are several issues in developing a successful direct delivery strategy. The fulfillment process for most consumer direct businesses can be divided into three phases: (1) order capture and promise, (2) order sourcing and assembly, and (3) order delivery. Our research effort focuses on the interactions between order promise (deciding on a delivery time) and order delivery (devising efficient delivery schedules). Better integration of these decisions has the potential to substantially improve profitability, especially for those consumer direct businesses offering "attended" deliveries. Attended deliveries are those where the consumers must be present and may be necessary for security reasons (e.g. expensive computer equipment), because goods are perishable (e.g. milk, flowers), or because goods are being picked up or exchanged (e.g. dry cleaning, videos/DVDs), and are a vital feature of many consumer direct service models. To provide a high service level and to avoid delivery failures as much as possible, it is customary in attended home delivery services for the company and customer to mutually agree on a narrow delivery window, or time slot.
In a previous paper (Campbell and Savelsbergh, 2002a) , we studied and developed methodologies for order acceptance decisions so as to maximize overall profit. The key idea underlying these methodologies is to exploit information about potential future orders to evaluate whether it is better to accept a customer's order or to reserve capacity for potential future orders. The techniques for making these decisions are based on modified insertion heuristics. As each order arrives, we compare the value of inserting that particular order versus inserting potential future orders that are properly discounted based on their probability of being realized. Computational results indicate that these order acceptance strategies can significantly increase 2 profits.
In this paper, we study and develop methodologies for a different aspect of the order acceptance decision, namely the promise of a delivery window. In practice, it is often the case, particularly in a struggling industry such as e-groceries where high customer retention is of utmost importance, that a vendor accepts an order unless it is impossible to satisfy the request. In such a scenario, we can potentially make significant improvements in routing costs through influencing customers' choices of delivery windows. If better windows are selected, not only will total distance be less, but the more efficient use of resources may increase the number of orders that can be accepted and create higher revenues. We will look specifically at offering discounts, or incentives, to customers to influence window selection.
Home delivery is a fairly new phenomenon, and thus few models and algorithms have been proposed and studied that help create an understanding of the complexities and intricacies of these distribution problems.
Our goal is to continue to change this by looking at new features and variations of the problem. The main contribution of the work reported in this paper is that we develop incentive schemes and demonstrate that these incentives schemes can significantly increase the profitability of companies providing home delivery.
The incentive computations involve the use of insertion heuristics as well as linear programming models. Our computational studies offer greater insight and better understanding of when incentives will be successful and what type of incentives will perform best. Another contribution of this paper, in our view, is that we formally propose two new optimization problems that capture the use of different types of incentives and allow the research community to focus on common problems. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we review the relevant literature, and in Section 2, we introduce the Home Delivery Problem with Time Slot Incentives. This variation allows the vendor to offer incentives to customers to choose specific time windows on a given day to a delivery. We discuss the model and related assumptions, propose methods for computing incentives, and present computational results that illustrate their success. In Section 3, we introduce a second version of the problem where vendors offer incentives to customers to accept wider time windows. We discuss how to modify the model and incentive computation and illustrate the impact of this change through computational results. We conclude with a summary, in Section 4, of the insights we obtained and a side note, in Section 5, on the value of computing 3 incentives for the earliest arriving orders.
Literature
Research on home delivery strategies is increasing, but most of the initial work has focused primarily on comparing the profits from very different service models rather than optimization in the design or performance of a single model. For example, Saranen and Smȧros (2001) simulate the delivery costs for two specific models, Streamline.com's unattended delivery policy and Webvan's attended half hour delivery window policy, and find the more restrictive Webvan model to cost five times more. For unattended home deliveries, where time slots are not of concern, Punakivi (2000) studies the trade-off between the use of fixed routes and the use of optimally sequencing the deliveries on routes as soon as all deliveries are known. Depending on the density of the delivery area, simulation reveals an average savings from using optimal routing of 18% to 54%. Yrjölä (2001) compares different strategies for picking the orders but also suggests values to use in evaluating the performance of an online grocer. Lin and Mahmassani (2002) summarize the delivery policies for many online grocers in the U.S. and use vehicle routing software to evaluate the impact of some of these policies on a few realistic instances of the problem. Both unattended and attended policies are compared, along with different delivery window widths.
The problem closest to the one addressed in this paper does not involve groceries, but involves scheduling repairmen to visit gas customers. In the problem considered by Madsen et al. (1995) , requests for service that arrive during one week are scheduled to be serviced during the following week. The request must be scheduled when it arrives, so the challenge is to commit to a particular delivery time window that will lead to efficient routing solutions when all remaining requests for the week have arrived. The proposed solution approach involves the selection of seeds for different areas and choosing where to insert requests based on insertion costs into routes containing the nearest seeds. Similar to the problem we study here, no probabilistic information about future requests is assumed. The problem is still very different, though, because it is the vendor who selects the delivery window.
There are also several related, but also distinctly different, research areas related to the study of incentives for home delivery and good routing practices for the resulting problems. These include the study of revenue 4 management, such as used with airline ticket prices, and the study of vehicle routing problems with stochastic demands and customers. A brief review of the literature in these areas is discussed in our earlier paper on home delivery (Campbell and Savelsbergh, 2002a) . One recent paper not included in this survey is Bent and Hentenryck (2002) . The authors exploit stochastic information about future requests to schedule requests under consideration, as done in Campbell and Savelsbergh (2002a) . The objective is to maximize the number of accepted requests , but the authors do not consider the option of rejecting an "expensive" delivery to preserve resources for more, future deliveries as done in Campbell and Savelsbergh (2002a) . The methodology proposed involves maintaining multiple sets of tentative route plans, which can each be examined to see if a particular request can be feasibly handled by the vendor. A related idea will be used in this paper. The authors test their algorithm on instances with varying degrees of dynamism (Larsen et al., 2002) , i.e., varying ratios of number of requests known in advance to the total number of requests.
The Home Delivery Problem with Time Slot Incentives

Problem Definition and Assumptions
We will now define the first dynamic routing and scheduling problem studied in this paper, which we will refer to as the Home Delivery Problem with Time Slot Incentives (HDPTI).
We have to construct a set of delivery routes for a specific day in the not too distant future. Requests from a known set of customers for a delivery on that particular day arrive in real-time and are considered up to a certain cut-off time T , which precedes the actual execution of the planned delivery routes. We accept each request that arrives if there is available capacity. We assume that each request consumes d i of the vehicle capacity and results in a revenue of r i . There is a homogeneous set of m vehicles with capacity Q to serve the accepted orders. To increase the level of service, we guarantee that the actual delivery will take place during a 1-hour time slot on the day of delivery. The 1-hour delivery time slots are non-overlapping and cover the entire day, e.g., 8.00 -9.00, 9.00 -10.00, ..., 19.00 -20.00. We assume that for each customer i, we know the probability p t i that they will choose a delivery in time slot t when an order is placed. When a request for service arrives, the vendor may offer incentives for different time slots up to an amount B. The probability of a customer choosing a particular time slot increases at rate x per dollar of incentive offered.
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An increase in the probability of one or more time slots is compensated for by a decrease in the probability of the other time slots with p t i values greater than zero (at an equal rate). The time slot selection by the customer is based on these modified probabilities. The objective is to maximize the total profit resulting from executing the resulting set of delivery routes, i.e., total revenue minus incentive and delivery costs, where we assume that the delivery costs depend linearly on the distance travelled.
We assume that incentives (discounts) will only be offered for time slots which have a probability of being selected that is greater than zero. Since the probability information will be based on historical data, a probability of zero would reflect that a customer has never selected a delivery during that particular slot, so it is likely that this time slot is not feasible or very undesirable for the customer. On the other hand, if two slots have positive and equal probability, it likely means that a customer is fairly indifferent between two time windows, so a small incentive might be able to influence the probability of choosing one over the other.
We have modelled consumer behavior by stating that the probability of choosing a particular time slot increases at a rate of x per dollar of incentive, and, since the probability of all time slots must sum to 1, the probability of all slots that do not receive an incentive must be decreased at the same rate. The total increase in probability created by incentives is divided up and removed equally from all of the time slots with nonzero probability not receiving an incentive. Consequently, the maximum incentive payout for a set of time slots is not only limited by the budget B, but also by the smallest probability among the time slots that do not receive an incentive (as probabilities cannot go below zero). This is one of the reasons why the selection of the set of time slots that will receive incentives, which will be discussed in more detail later, is a non-trivial decision.
We also have to specify what happens when some of the time slots with positive probability are currently infeasible given all of the orders that have already been accepted (and assigned a time slot). We have examined two options. First, if delivering to customer i in a time slot t with positive probability p t i of being selected is infeasible (which implies that this time slot is not presented to the customer as a delivery option), we will assume that this probability p t i will be redistributed equally among the feasible time slots with positive probability. Second, we will alternately assume that the customer will walk away with probability 6 p t i . Note that we do assume that the probability of choosing to walk away, i.e., choosing an infeasible time slot, can be reduced by offering incentives to other feasible time slots. In environments where demand is less than capacity (i.e., undersaturated markets) using incentives to prevent customers from walking away can be critical in maximizing profits.
Note that a major difference with the setup considered in our previous paper is that we will not assume any stochastic information about future requests. This not only simplifies the incentive computations, but also eliminates the need to generate accurate and reliable information about future requests. If incentives based only on the set of already accepted requests and the request under consideration prove to be successful in increasing profits, it follows that the results will only improve as more information about the future is included in the incentive computations.
Note also that all orders are received prior to the execution of any delivery schedule. That is, we will not consider "same day delivery" services where orders arrive during the execution of a delivery schedule and have to be incorporated immediately. We feel this is justified because in many consumer home delivery environments the vehicles will be loaded with customer specific orders so once a vehicle has started its route it cannot be re-routed to a new customer since the correct inventory will likely not be on board.
Determining Feasibility and Cost
As a first step towards designing a solution approach for the HDPTI, we start by developing technology to dynamically determine whether an order, which is characterized by a size and a delivery address can be accommodated during a particular time window given the set of already accepted orders. We will use the same technology to estimate what the order's contribution to profit will be if delivery is made during a given window. A key goal of this study is to determine if using profit estimates based only on currently accepted orders is sufficient to create effective incentives, so these estimates need to be accurate as possible while quickly computed.
To dynamically determine whether we can accommodate an order in a particular time slot, we have to determine if there exists a set of routes visiting all previously accepted orders as well as the order under consideration. The order under consideration must be visited during the particular time slot, and all previously accepted orders must be visited in their committed time slots for the resulting schedule to be feasible. It is well known that deciding whether a feasible solution to the vehicle routing problem with time windows exists is NP-complete (Savelsbergh, 1986) , so it is natural to consider employing heuristics to answer the question of feasibility quickly.
We evaluate this question in two phases: first we create a set of schedules for the already accepted orders and second we evaluate the feasibility (and then cost) of inserting the order under consideration into these schedules. We use a combination of insertion heuristics and randomization to build this set of S (S > 1) schedules with the previously accepted requests. It is important to have S > 1 since using S = 1 often prematurely suggests that certain time slots are infeasible when they may in fact be feasible in other schedules of similar cost but slightly different ordering. When it comes to estimating cost, using S = 1 may also lead to an overestimate since slightly different orderings may allow the same insertion at very different prices.
Creation of the S Schedules
To build each of the S schedules, we iteratively insert deliveries into a schedule until all previously accepted deliveries are included or an infeasibility occurs. At each iteration, we evaluate the feasibility and insertion cost of each uninserted delivery at each point in the partially built schedule. Since all previously accepted requests have specific guaranteed time slots, an insertion is feasible only if it can occur during this time slot.
For each inserted order i in the schedule under construction, we maintain values e i and l i representing the earliest and latest times delivery can begin given the committed time slot and position on the partially built route. An order j can feasibly be inserted between already inserted orders i − 1 and i during a time window t (begin t , end t ) if and only if
and
If the insertion is feasible, then we can evaluate the cost according to the standard "extra mileage" insertion
We keep track of the k orders with the smallest insertion costs at each iteration (and their corresponding insertion points in the current schedule) and randomly choose from among these to determine which order is inserted next in the schedule. This is a typical GRASP procedure (Feo and Resende, 1995) . After each insertion, we update the e i values for the inserted order as well as all orders following it and the l i value for the inserted order and all orders preceding it. (See Campbell and Savelsbergh (2002b) for a survey of efficient implementations of insertion heuristics.) We can repeat this procedure until all accepted orders are inserted or one of these accepted deliveries can not be feasibly inserted. If construction completes normally (all accepted deliveries inserted), we record the total distance required for the schedule and represent this value with C(s). Let C( * ) = min s∈S C(s). Due to the randomization, the schedules may be quite different in ordering, but if k is small, say 2 or 3, the constructed schedules are usually fairly similar in total cost.
Cost Estimation
After the construction of the S schedules, we can evaluate the cost associated the order currently under consideration during a particular time window by computing the cost of including it in each of these schedules.
For each completed schedule s, we attempt to insert j at each insertion point possible during time window
This value represents the "true" added cost associated with making this delivery to j. Without C( * ) and C(s) terms, the computation would only represent the increase in cost with respect to schedule s. This could disguise the fact that a cheap insertion can only occur if an otherwise much more expensive schedule is used.
We maintain the lowest insertion cost for each time slot t and represent its final value, after evaluating all S schedules, with C t . (We also maintain associated schedule s and point of insertion into s.) These C t values form the basis for our incentive calculations, since they indicate the minimum cost to make a delivery in a time slot t. 9
Modelling the Home Delivery Problem with Time Slot Incentives
In the previous section, we described how to determine quickly whether it is feasible to insert an order in a time slot t and how to compute an associated value C t for that insertion. If we find that the C t values vary widely for different time slots, then we may want to offer an incentive to the customer for choosing a time slot with a higher profit. Offering incentives raises many challenging questions, such as
• How do we decide which time slot(s) receive an incentive?
• How do we decide on the size of the incentive(s)?
We can start to answer this second question by modelling the relationships described in the problem definition for the HDPTI. Recall that for each customer i, delivery in time slot t will be selected with probability p t i if no incentives are offered. Furthermore, the probability of choosing a particular time slot increases at rate x per dollar of incentive offered, and the probability of all slots that do not receive an incentive will decrease at an equal rate.
Next, note that we cannot offer an incentive to all time slots with p t i > 0, since the increased probability resulting from the incentives must be discounted from other slots. Thus, to model this problem, we must divide the set of time slots with nonzero probability of being selected into two groups. Let
• T = set of time slots with p t i > 0
• U = subset of T that may receive an incentive
• V = subset of T not receiving an incentive
We want to find
• I t = the incentive for time slot t
• z = probability removed from non-incentive slots so as to maximize expected profitability.
Given the above and our basic assumption that insertion costs are a good reflection of future costs, the incentive decision for customer i can be represented by the following incentive optimization problem:
In the objective, the first portion represents the product of the adjusted profit and adjusted probability associated with awarding an incentive I t to slot t in U . The product is the expected profitability from slots where incentives are offered. Likewise, the second portion represents the expected profits from the slots with no incentives with profits and probabilities adjusted accordingly. The first constraint in Equation 7 limits z such that the adjusted probability of each slot not receiving an incentive cannot fall below zero. The second constraint, Equation 8, sets z equal to the increase in probability created by incentives, so the sum of all probabilities will remain equal to 1. Finally, Equation 9 restricts each incentive below the pre-specified
We can use the above model to compute a set of incentives that maximize expected profits given the partitioning of time slots into sets U and V . This still leaves the question of how to decide which time slots should be assigned to sets U and V to maximize the expected profit. This decision is actually not straightforward as it may seem because it is based on the insertion costs in conjunction with the probabilities involved. The following are some observations concerning the selection of set U .
Observation 1. If a single time slot is considered for an incentive (| U |= 1), it is possible that the optimal incentive is zero even if that time slot has the uniquely lowest insertion cost. 
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In fact, the optimal value for any single incentive I t is zero whenever the following holds
This can be derived by manipulating the objective function given the observation that if there is a single time slot t that can receive an incentive, then z =
shows that if we consider offering an incentive for a single slot, the optimal value will be zero unless the profit from this time slot is greater than the average profit from the other slots plus
x . In the example, the average profit for time slots other than time slot 1 is 6 and
.10 = 5. The profit from slot 1 is 10, which is less than 6 + 5 = 11, so it is better to offer no incentive to time slot 1. The result is interesting because it reveals that offering an incentive for a time slot with a higher insertion cost may actually result in a higher expected profit than offering an incentive to a time slot with a lower insertion cost because of the relative probabilities p t i .
The above can be generalized to situations where we consider providing incentives for more than one time slot.
Observation 2. The optimal value for any incentive I t for t ∈ U is zero whenever the following holds
Observation 3. If a single time slot is considered for an incentive (| U |= 1) and the optimal incentive is zero, it is possible that it will receive a positive incentive when considered in conjunction with another time slot.
Example. Consider the instance presented with Observation 1, but let U = {1, 2} and V = {3}. If Observe that an incentive for a (single) time slot decreases the probabilities associated with other (high profit or low cost) time slots resulting in lower overall expected profits, whereas when the time slot is considered together with another time slot, an incentive may increase expected profits. In the above example, both time slots 1 and 2 would not receive an incentive if considered by themselves, but when considered together it is beneficial for both to receive a positive incentive. This result is significant because it shows that just because a time slot does not receive an incentive when considered by itself, we cannot stop considering it when trying to find the best set U .
The above also demonstrates that it may be necessary to offer incentives to more than one time slot to increase expected profits. This can be a result of the quadratic nature of the expected profit function as well as the budget limit B.
These observations should demonstrate that selecting a set U of time slots to consider for incentives so as to maximize the expected profit is nontrivial. The likely candidates for the set U are the time slots with the cheapest insertion costs because of the profits they offer, but customer behavior, represented through the selection probabilities, also impacts the choice.
In our computational experiments, we will compare choosing the k time slots with the cheapest insertion costs for the set U with an exhaustive search over all possible combinations of k time slots for the set U .
The latter option may be impractical in terms of runtime, especially for larger values of k, but will give a good measure of how well simply choosing the time slots with the cheapest insertion cost performs.
Solving the Home Delivery Problem with Time Slot Incentives
Before we can evaluate the impact of incentives on the actual profits, we must figure out how to actually solve the proposed model quickly. After removing constant terms and with a little rewriting, the objective function in the model becomes
This highlights how profitability is gained and where it is lost as a result of incentives. We observe that the objective function has a quadratic term for each time slot for which we offer an incentive. Since solving quadratic programs can be (too) time consuming for an online algorithm, we will use a linear approximation of the problem.
We approximate each quadratic term (I t ) 2 with a piecewise linear function over l − 1 intervals between I t = 0 and I t = u where
The first quantity defining the upper bound u of I t is the budget available for incentives, and the second quantity is the amount of incentive that can be spent on a single time slot before the time slot t ∈ V with the smallest positive probability becomes zero. This requires l (additional) variables y
Normally, piecewise linear approximations require the introduction of integer variables. However, because
2 is nonincreasing and convex on the interval of interest and we are maximizing, the integer variables are not needed. Thus, we can solve the approximation as a linear program. (For a general discussion of how to approximate a continuous function of one variable with a piecewise linear function see Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988) .)
The resulting incentive optimization linear program is as follows
subject to: 
Computational Experiments
Our primary goal in this section is to conduct computational experiments to determine the impact on total profit of using incentives to influence customer behavior. Furthermore, we want to study and compare methods for choosing the value of these incentives. Finally, we want to analyze the impact of instance characteristics on the performance of our proposed technology.
14 In our testing, we want to compare the total profit, i.e., total revenue -total costs -total incentives paid, associated with using incentives schemes of different forms. The following is a list of the five methods whose results are included in the tables. These five were selected to illustrate the impact of certain characteristics of the problem and solution methodology. Each of the five methods, except for BSTLP, completes within a couple seconds.
• N OIN C: To evaluate the impact of incentives, we determine the profits when no incentives are provided. This means that each customer's time slot selection is based on initial p t i values, with adjustments made only if time slots are infeasible (as discussed in section 2.2).
• CHP F LT : To evaluate the impact of sophisticated incentive computations (e.g., our linear programming based incentive optimization techniques), we determine the profits when a simple incentive scheme is used. A simple and straightforward incentive scheme is to award equal incentives to the k time slots with cheapest insertion costs. As usual, the value of the incentive will be limited by the budget B and the time slot not receiving with the smallest positive probability. (No incentives are awarded if the k time slots have equal insertion costs, since there is clearly no advantage to offering incentives in that situation.)
• CHP LP : We want to evaluate the impact of different rules for choosing the sets U and V used in the incentive optimization problem. A natural rule is to choose the k time slots with the cheapest insertion costs to be in the set U . Note that this does not mean that all k time slots will necessarily receive an incentive, but only these time slots may receive an incentive. In fact, when the optimal incentive for a time slot in U is zero, it is moved to set V and the reduced incentive optimization problem is resolved.
This process repeats until all optimal incentives are positive. (Otherwise, we have a situation in which we remove z from the probabilities associated with the time slots in V , but simultaneously have time slots in U receiving no incentive and their associated probability is not reduced.)
• BST LP : Another rule, though computationally intensive, is to enumerate all possible sets U of size one up to k, solve the incentive optimization problem for each set U , and select the one that maximizes expected profits. This allows us to evaluate how much we give up by greedily choosing the k cheapest time slots to comprise the set U .
• BST : To serve as an "upper bound", we also evaluate what happens when customers always select the time slot preferred by the vendor (ideal customer behavior). In this setup, the time slot with the cheapest insertion cost is always selected and no incentives are paid. (Our computational experiments will show that this is not a true upper bound as the associated profit can sometimes be exceeded by other approaches. This does not represent erroneous behavior, but is a reflection of the true dynamic nature of the problem.)
Such analysis can only be performed by means of simulation. Simulation is used to generate a stream of delivery requests at different points in time between 0 and the cut-off time T . Given this stream of arrivals of delivery requests, we can evaluate the behavior of the different methods listed above by using them to decide incentives and then simulate consumer response to these offers.
For each test, 25 instances are generated, and the results are averaged to create the associated table.
In all experiments, the customers are uniformly distributed over an area of dimension 60 units by 60 units where each vehicle can travel one unit per minute. There are 12 windows of 60 minutes available each day to make deliveries. For each customer, probabilities are generated for each of the possible delivery windows, and these probabilities follow certain patterns. Specifically, we create and solve 3 variations of each instance that are different in terms of how much one time slot is preferred to the others. Probability multipliers (P ROBM U LT ) of 1, 2, and 3 are tested to see how probability values impact the results. A probability multiplier of 1 means that all feasible slots are equally likely to be selected by the customer, where a probability multiplier of 3 indicates there is one slot that is three times more likely to be selected than the others. The slot that is "preferred" by a given customer is randomly selected, and all customers initially have nonzero p t i values for at most 8 of the 12 possible delivery windows. Revenue for each delivery is $100, and probability increases at a rate of 0.2 per dollar of incentive. The limit on each incentive is set at $5, and the stop time to complete the delivery to each customer is 20 minutes. The vehicles are of unlimited capacity which is a common assumption in consumer direct delivery since time is far more restraining than space in these applications. In terms of the algorithm, the quadratic term is approximated with 5 pieces, and 50 schedules (S = 50) are created using a GRASP factor of 3.
Experiments
We start by presenting the results for the 25 instances of the basic data set described above. The five methods are compared not only for different probability multipliers but also for different sizes of the set U .
Besides the difference in profit associated with different sizes of U , there may be other reasons why a certain number of members of U is preferable. For example, experience may indicate that it is less confusing for a customer to be offered one incentive than negotiating many varied incentives. Thus, we are interested in evaluating how many incentives are needed to obtain the majority of benefits that incentives can offer or finding out if it is true that more is "always better." The results presented in Table 1 clearly demonstrate the value of incentives. All approaches incorporating an incentive scheme increase the profit by 10% or more on average. Furthermore, the results also show that significantly higher profits can be achieved when using more sophisticated technology to decide which slots are eligible for incentives and how large the incentives should be (1219.82 versus 1446.67 with probability multiplier 1 and considering 4 time slots for incentives). Next, we will focus on the results for probability multiplier 1, i.e., each customer has no preference among the delivery windows that are acceptable to him.
We see that when the number of time slots eligible for an incentive increases, the performance of the simple greedy incentive scheme (CHP F LT ) degrades (from 1373.20 to 1219.82) as it has no mechanism to differentiate between different time slots. On the other hand, we see that the performance of the linear programming based incentive schemes improves (from 1362.24 to 1446.67 for BSTLP). Although the same behavior can be observed with other probability multipliers, it is not as pronounced. This is understandable because the stronger the preference is for a single delivery window, the harder it will be to influence the customer's behavior with incentives. This shows that a thorough analysis of customer behavior is important when considering the use of incentive schemes. It is also interesting to observe the performance of our "upper bound". Recall that for the upper bound we assume that the customer always does exactly what we want him to do without having to pay incentives. The fact that in many cases the incentive based approaches are able to achieve higher profits reflects the dynamic nature of the problem and the fact that the optimization of short term decisions may not always be best for the longer term.
In the above instances, even though 30 orders arrive, only around 14 can be served (since the final profit is a little over 1300). We investigated whether there is a dramatic change if only the first 15 orders are considered. With fewer customers, each customer can significantly impact cost and revenue. The most striking difference in Table 2 , when compared with the earlier results, is that the upper bound now always dominates the other approaches. This probably indicates that some of the differences we observed in the previous results were caused by being able to accept a single order late in the simulation when the schedule is nearly full (time wise). It remains true that the use of incentives is beneficial and that more 18 sophisticated incentive schemes outperform simplistic incentive schemes.
For the remaining experiments in this section, we revert back to 30 orders arriving, but limit ourselves to considering two time slots for incentives. Considering two time slots for incentives seems to guarantee a substantial increase in profits and simplifies the analysis of the results. Table 3 reflects what happens when the budget for incentives increases. These results indicate that a larger budget for incentives does not automatically translate to increased profits. To a large extent, this is caused by the fact that the incentives awarded are bounded not only by the budget, but also by the smallest positive probability of time slots not receiving an incentive. We have observed that it is usually the latter that is constraining. However, we do see some improvements from increasing a $2 budget to $5.
We have modelled incentive impact as a linear relation: for each dollar of incentive the probability that the customer selects a delivery window increases by x, i.e.,p
we investigate what happens
for various values of x in Table 4 . As expected, we see that our ability to increase profits by awarding incentives increases with the impact the incentives have on customer behavior. Furthermore, the effects are more pronounced with the more sophisticated incentive schemes as they are better able to exploit the higher incentive impact by judiciously deciding the size of each incentive.
Next, we examine what happens when customers are more restrictive in terms of which delivery windows are acceptable to them. So far, we have assumed that there are 8 delivery windows with positive probability of being selected by a customer. In the results reported in Table 5 , the customers only have 4 delivery windows with positive probability of being selected. As this setup may be somewhat more realistic, we are presenting the expanded set of results, i.e., also varying the number of time slots considered for incentives. Several interesting observations can be made when examining these results. First, even though still slightly better on average, the greedy simplistic incentive scheme in many instances results in a profit that is less than the profit obtained without awarding incentives. Second, the linear program based incentive optimization schemes perform extremely well; significantly better than the simplistic incentive scheme. In fact, method CHP LP outperforms N OIN C in all cases! This demonstrates that with fewer acceptable 20 delivery windows and with fewer options, a judicious choice of incentives is a must.
Finally, we consider the situation in which we assume that customers walk away with probability p t i if delivery window t is not presented to them as a delivery option, i.e., the probability p 
subject to:
The time slots in the set F do not appear in the objective function since we assume that there is no profit when a customer walks away. However, the time slot with the smallest probability in F may be binding, unless a more restrictive probability is found in V (Equation 21). Again, the quadratic term can be approximated by a piecewise linear function as before to create a linear program.
It is amazing to see the drop in profit in Table 6 when no incentives are awarded when walkaways are allowed.
The profit drops almost 20%. This shows that using incentives to help in increasing revenues by discouraging or even dissuading customers from walking may be even more important in increasing profit than simply reducing delivery costs.
The Home Delivery Problem with Wider Slot Incentives
Delivery costs are impacted significantly by the stringent 1-hour delivery windows. In our earlier paper, we demonstrated that expanding a 1-hour delivery window to 2 hours can increase profits by 6.64% and can be increased an additional 5.61% if further expanded to 3 hours. Consequently, instead of using incentives to encourage the use of 1-hour delivery windows preferred from a scheduling perspective, we may alternatively consider using incentives to encourage the use of wider delivery windows which increases our scheduling flexibility and therefore may increase profits.
Problem Definition and Assumptions
To study the benefits of using incentives to encourage the consumer to accept wider time windows, we define the Home Delivery Problem with Wider Slot Incentives (HDPWI).
We have to construct a set of delivery routes for a specific day in the not too distant future. Requests from a known set of customers for a delivery on that particular day arrive in real-time and are considered up to a certain cut-off time T , which precedes the actual execution of the planned delivery routes. We have to accept each request that arrives if there is available capacity. We assume that each request consumes d i of the vehicle capacity and results in a revenue of r i . There is a homogeneous set of m vehicles with capacity Q to serve the accepted orders. To increase the level of service, we guarantee that the actual delivery will take place during a 1-hour time slot on the day of delivery. The 1-hour delivery time slots are non-overlapping and cover the entire day, e.g., 8.00 -9.00, 9.00 -10.00, ..., 19.00 -20.00. We assume that for each customer i, we know the probability p t i that they will choose a delivery in time slot t when an order is placed. When 22 a request for service arrives, the vendor may offer incentives for the selection of a 2-hour delivery window up to an amount of B. The 2-hour delivery windows are assumed to also cover the entire day, but overlap, e.g., 8:00-10:00, 9:00-11:00,..., 18:00-20:00. The probability of selecting a 2-hour delivery window is initially zero but increases at rate y per dollar of incentive offered. An increase in probability of a 2-hour time slot is compensated for by a decrease in probability of all 1-hour time slots with p t i values greater than zero (at an equal rate). The time slot selection is then made by the customer and is based on these modified probabilities. The objective is to maximize the total profit resulting from executing the set of delivery routes,
i.e., total revenue minus incentives costs and delivery costs.
Not all 2-hour delivery windows are viable candidates to receive an incentive. It seems reasonable to assume that a customer would not be interested in a wider time slot if either of the component 1 hour time slots have a zero probability of being selected. (A zero probability indicates a delivery in the window is impossible or highly undesirable and agreeing to a larger delivery window would signal that this is no longer the case.) Similarly, it is also reasonable to eliminate a wider time slot from consideration when it is infeasible for the vendor to make the delivery to the customer in one of the component time slots.
Modeling with Wider Time Slots
In the HDPTI, an increase in the probability of a time slot due to an incentive is compensated for by a decrease in probability of the time slots in V (at an equal rate). In the HDPWI, an increase in the probability of a wider time slot is again compensated for by a decrease in the probability of other time slots (at an equal rate), but now the set V of other time slots consists of all 1-hour time slots with positive probability. In this way, the two incentive models are fairly similar in terms of how money is traded for probability. There is a significant advantage, though, in the HDPWI over the HDPTI, from a computational perspective. Since the set of time slots for which the probability decreases is the same regardless of the set of (wider) time slots that are being considered for incentives, the selection of the time slots which may receive incentives becomes much easier.
In the incentive optimization problem presented below, we will refer to the set of 2-hour windows under consideration for an incentive as W (as opposed to U ), while V continues to represent the 1-hour slots not receiving an incentive for which the probability may be reduced (now containing all 1-hour time slots with positive probability). Therefore, let
• W = set of 2-hour time slots under consideration for an incentive
• V = set of 1-hour time slots with positive probability
• C (t,t+1) = cost of inserting a delivery in the 2-hour time slot spanning 1-hour time slots t and t + 1, i.e., C (t,t+1) = Min(C t , C t+1 ).
• I (t,t+1) = the incentive for the 2-hour time slot spanning 1-hour time slots t and t + 1
• z = the probability removed from 1-hour time slots in V so as to maximize expected profitability.
The incentive decision for customer i can be represented by the following optimization problem:
In the objective, Equation 24, the first portion represents the expected profit from wider time slots receiving incentives and the second portion represents the expected profit from the 1-hour slots. Since all 2-hour time slots in W initially have zero probability of being selected, the probability of each wider slot being selected is based entirely on incentives, and wider slots do not impact the bound on the amount of incentives that can be awarded (Equation 25). With this model, it is easy to see that it is always optimal to include the 2-hour time slots with the smallest C (t,t+1) values in W .
Even though it is possible to consider all viable 2-hour windows in the incentive optimization problem, it is easy to show that it will never be the case that all receive an incentive in an optimal solution.
Observation. A 2-hour time slot will not receive an incentive if it has a profit which is less than the average profit of the 1-hour slots, i.e., I (t,t+1) = 0 when
This is not only true when a 2-hour time slot is considered by itself, but also when it is considered in conjunction with other 2-hour time slots.
As before, we can approximate the quadratic terms with a piecewise linear function and transform the the incentive optimization problem into a linear program. As a result, incentives for wider time slots can also be computed within a few seconds.
Computational Results
The setup used for the computational experiments is the same as before with only minor changes. There is no longer any reason to include BST LP since, as we have discussed above, we know the best set W of size k is the one with the k least cost insertions. There is also a small change in the implementation of BST . In BST tests, all customers receive a delivery in a wider time slot if one is viable, and if none are viable, the customer receives a delivery during the cheapest 1-hour window. Given this, the tables with computational results follow. From the base results in Table 7 , we can conclude the value and potential of 2-hour time windows is huge because the BST values are significantly higher than the N OIN C values, but incentives are not yet capable of fully capitalizing on the opportunities. Both incentive schemes still substantially increase profits, and the optimization based approach still outperforms the simplistic greedy although not by as much as before. It may be the case that with wider time slots it is key to convince customers to accept a wider delivery window, but that it is less important which wider delivery window they select. The results in Table 8 reveal that, compared to the base case results, incentive schemes do a much better job of bridging the gap between N OIN C and BST and perform extremely well. Table 9 indicates that an increased budget leads to increased profits up to the point where the bound on incentive awards is determined by the smallest positive probability among the 1-hour time slots for which the selection probability has to be decreased. As with the HDPTI, this translates to an increase profit when B increases to $5, but no improvement when it further increases to $8.
The results in Table 10 illustrate, as expected, our ability to increase profits by awarding incentives increases with the impact the incentives have on customer behavior.
The results in Table 11 reveal that there is little difference between using a simplistic incentive scheme and a more sophisticated incentive scheme when offering wider slot incentives to customers with few feasible 26 windows. Through offering incentives to customers to select wider time windows, both CHP F LT and CHP LP create significantly higher profits than N OIN C, but the actual choice of incentives seems to make less of a difference. This strengthens our belief that to increase profits it is much more important to convince customers to accept a wider delivery window than it is to encourage them to select a particular one.
Finally, the results in Table 12 demonstrate that incentives help increase revenues by dissuading customers from walking away, as with the HDPTI. Furthermore, the results reinforce that the more time slots are considered for incentives, the more important it becomes to use more sophisticated incentives schemes. 
Insights
The primary objective of this study was to determine if it is possible to increase the profitability of home delivery operations without having to rely on hard to obtain stochastic information about future orders.
Our computational experiments clearly demonstrate that that is possible even with relatively simple greedy incentive schemes. A summary of the insights obtained is given below.
• Incorporating incentive schemes can significantly enhance profit.
• Incorporating intelligence into incentive schemes can significantly enhance their performance.
• It is sufficient to provide incentives to only a few delivery windows (≤ 3)
• The more time slots are considered for incentives, the more important it becomes to use more sophisticated incentives schemes.
• It is easier to develop successful incentive schemes based on encouraging customers to accept the wider delivery windows.
The Value of Optimization
In recent studies of online, dynamic routing problems, e.g., Bayraksan (2000) for the travelling salesman problem, questions concerning the value of optimization are raised and addressed. For example, it is not clear that when insertion is used to add stops to a tour (as this results in extremely fast response times)
there is value in starting from an optimized routing solution versus starting from a heuristic routing solution.
The study by Bayraksan shows that only after 40% of the orders have materialized it becomes valuable to start from an optimized travelling salesman tour.
In the HDPTI (or the HDPWI), there is a similar question that can be asked. Because it is not clear that the insertion costs based only on the first few arrivals adequately reflect the final costs of servicing the order, it is not clear that these insertion costs can be used to compute useful incentives. This issue was raised earlier in the discussion of the computational results for Table 1 . Thus, we have performed an experiment to specifically address and study this issue. In the results presented in Table 13 , the first 25% of customers that place an order do not receive an incentive. Only after these the first 25% of customers have been scheduled, we start using the insertion costs to compute incentives for the remaining 75% of requests, where feasible.
The idea being that maybe only after 25% of orders have been processed, the insertion costs adequately reflect the true costs of servicing an order and can therefore be used to compute meaningful incentives.
For ease of comparison, Table 13 includes the results from the case in which all orders are candidates for incentives (right from the start) as well as the case in which the first 25% are not considered for incentives.
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ST ART P CT reflects the percent of expected arrivals that occur before incentives are used. At most 2 incentives are offered to each potential delivery. Surprisingly, we see that not offering incentives to the first 25% of the customers hurts the profit for all incentive methods and for all probability multipliers. This demonstrates that incentives can be critical even in the early stages of building the schedule. It should be noted that the same experiment with the HDPWI had very similar results.
